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NOTES
THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT IN THE STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING: BETTS v. BRADY IS INTERRED
Implicit in the Anglo-American concept of ordered liberty is a noble
ideal-that all men accused of crime should be brought before an impartial tribunal where each stands equal before the law. The legislative
acts of our state and national governments and the Bill of Rights of the
federal constitution with the constitutions of the several states have placed
much emphasis on substantive and procedural safeguards designed to
assure a fair trial. Yet, if because of his poverty, or for other reasons,
an accused is denied access to what has properly been called his "most
pervasive right"'-the right to counsel-those eloquent expressions of
equality and justice remain but an ideal. Without the right to counsel
other safeguards of a fair trial are deprived of their full significance and
falter in their role as a vital and moving force in our system of criminal
justice. Indeed, with the ever increasing complexity of our society, there
has been, in the last half century, a corresponding increase in the number
of people charged with serious crimes, and the need for counsel to aid
the indigent accused becomes more evident.
Historically, under the Articles of Confederation and since the adoption of the Constitution, Americans have always thought the right to
counsel fundamental when counsel is desired and retained by an accused
in a criminal prosecution.2 At a time when England was just beginning
to permit an accused to provide his own counsel in a felony case the sixth
amendment was adopted,3 providing that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense."4
Although the fundamental character of the right to counsel was
recognized at a very early time by Americans, for many years there was
no Supreme Court case on the subject.' The proposition that the Constitution imposes an obligation upon the courts to appoint counsel to as1.

Karisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue

on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1962).
2. Powell v. Alabama, 237 U.S. 45 (1932); HELLER, THE SIXTr AMENDMENT 110
(1951).
3. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL IN AMERICAN CouRTs 11 (1955).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
5. Holtzoff, The Right to Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L. REv.

1 (1944).
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sist indigent defendants is a relatively recent development. Since the decision in Powell v. Alabanvi in 1932, however, the American courts have
given a broader interpretation to the right to counsel under the Constitution than that which was previously acknowledged. In 1942 the Supreme
Court in Betts v. Brady,7 enunciated the "special circumstances" test for
measuring the minimum requirements which a state court must meet in
assigning counsel in order to provide a "fair trial" under the fourteenth
amendment. Under this standard it is held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration
of a defendant not represented by counsel only when under the "special
circumstances" of the case such a denial acts to deprive the accused of a
"fair trial." This standard has proved to be inadequate to meet the demands of an expanded concept of the right to counsel.
Because of its failure to insure a fair trial for an indigent defendant,
the Supreme Court recently found it necessary to overrule Betts v. Brady
in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright.8 On the same day, in a decision
following logically from the Gideon case the Court, in Douglas v. Californica,' declared that at least in certain situations the minimum requirements of a fair trial demand that a state court appoint counsel for indigent defendants on appeal. These two decisions should be welcomed as
a definite step forward in the progress of American constitutional law.
Their content and scope, and the reasons for the underlying reluctance
of the Court to overrule the impotent "special circumstances" rule merit
more thorough consideration.
The inequities and impracticability inherent in the "special circurmstances" rule might perhaps best be elucidated by discussing it in its application to the plea of guilty, for it would appear that under the Betts
standard a conviction entered on a plea of guilty is more likely to stand
on review than a conviction following a plea of not guilty and a subsequent trial. However, in order to lay a foundation for further discussion, the development of the right to counsel in American courts will first
be examined.
THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
In order to fully understand the problems involved in an analysis of
the right to counsel, it is necessary to distinguish between the right to retained counsel and the right to appointed counsel under the Constitution.
6.
7.
8.
9.

287
316
372
372

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

45 (1932).
455 (1942).
335 (1963).
353 (1963).

NOTES
The Constitution, by the sixth amendment, and twelve of the original
thirteen states by provisions in their respective constitutions, guaranteed
the right to counsel.1" However, the wording of these provisions was for
the most part in the form of a grant of a privilege, and their basic intent
and purpose was to abrogate the common law rules which denied representation by counsel in criminal proceedings.1 It appears that there was,
therefore, adequate provision for retained counsel early in the history of
the American judiciary. On the other hand, although many courts took
it upon themselves to provide counsel for indigents, it was not considered
that the Constitution imposed a duty upon a trial court in any case to
assign counsel to an indigent defendant until 1932.
With the weight of history before them,' 2 the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Powell v. Alabama." It faced squarely for
the first time the issue of whether there existed, under any circumstances,
a right to appointed counsel in cases arising in the state courts. The defendants had pleaded guilty to a charge of rape, a capital offense in
Alabama, and were subsequently convicted in a trial which is singular in
its complete lack of a proper judicial atmosphere. 4
Mr. Justice Sutherland, delivering the opinion of the Court, pointed
out that the fourteenth amendment always requires the observance of
certain rights of a fundamental character associated with a hearing and
that the right to counsel is numbered among them." During the course
of the opinion he declared in broad terms that because of a lack of familiarity with the intricacies of the law a layman could not receive a fair
trial without the aid of counsel." In the years immediately following
the decision, these general statements were cited as authority for the
proposition that it would be a violation of the due process clause to fail
to assign counsel to an accused charged with a felony in any state court.'1
However, such a statement would appear erroneous in view of the explicit
circumstances to which Justice Sutherland limited the holding of the
Court:
10.

HELLER,

11. Ibid.

op. cit. supra note 2, at 110.

12. For a brief account of the history of the right to counsel in American courts
before the decision in Powell v. Alabama, see BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 14-16.

13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

14. Although it does not appear that the defendants were ever seriously in danger
of mob violence, the entire trial, from the time the defendants were arrested to the time
they were sentenced, was accompanied by the military. When the boys appeared for
trial without counsel the trial judge made a perfunctory appointment of the entire bar
to represent them without designating any one lawyer as counsel for the defense. Id. at

55-56.

15. Id. at 68.
16. See quote accompanying footnote 70 infra.
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 287 (1935).
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All that is necessary now to decide . . . is that in a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him
as a necessary requisite of due process of law. .... "
Although it appears rather anomalous, the decision in Powell, based
upon the fourteenth amendment, preceded by six years a decision by the
Court interpreting the sixth amendment as requiring the federal courts,
under given circumstances, to appoint counsel for indigents. In the case
of Johnson v. Zerbst,"9 the accused and a companion, while on leave from
the Marines, were arrested for counterfeiting. Although they were represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, the defendants were unable to employ counsel for trial, and the court did not offer to appoint
counsel for them. The Supreme Court held that the defendants had been
deprived of their rights under the sixth amendment. Mr. Justice Black,
delivering the opinion of the Court, quoted from Powell v. Alabama, and
concluded that the sixth amendment "withholds from the federal courts
in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.""0
In 1945 the holding of the Johnson, case became the basis of Rule 44
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that a defendant who appears in a federal court without counsel has a right to
appointed counsel, that he shall be advised of such right, and that counsel
shall be appointed to represent him unless he elects to proceed without
counsel or is able to obtain counsel of his own choosing.2 Since the
promulgation of Rule 44 it has generally been settled that an indigent
accused in a federal court is entitled to appointed counsel.
In Betts v. Brady22 the Supreme Court formulated the "special circumstances" test which, although under constant attack, stood for twenty
years as the constitutional guide for determining a violation of due
process in relation to the right to counsel in state courts. The accused,
who was indicted for robbery in Maryland, had no funds with which to
employ counsel and so informed the judge at his arraignment. The judge
declined his request for counsel stating that it was not the practice in
that county to appoint counsel for indigents except on charges of rape or
18. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).

19. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20. Id. at 463.

21.

FED.

1R.CRIm. P. 44.

22. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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murder. 3 The defendant pleaded not guilty and was subsequently convicted by a jury. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the accused, relying principally on Powell v. Alabama, contended that due process demands in every case, whatever the circumstances, that a state must
furnish counsel to an indigent in a state criminal prosecution. The Court
affirmed the conviction by a vote of six to three.
In order to determine whether the concept embodied in the sixth
amendment is so essential to due process of law and to a fair trial that it
is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment, Mr.
Justice Roberts, who delivered the opinion of the Court, undertook to
examine certain historical materials, including "constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present
date." 24 On the basis of this investigation he concluded that "this material demonstrates that in the great majority of the States, it has been
the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their
courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential
to a fair trial. 25- Mr. Justice Roberts conceded that a denial by a state of
rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments might, in connection
with other elements, operate in a specific case to deprive an accused of
due process. But, he pointed out, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate generally, the specific guarantees
of the sixth amendment," and concluded that to deduce such a binding
rule from the due process clause would be to ignore the historical foundation of the right to counsel in the individual states and the distinction
between criminal charges in the various jurisdictions.2" It was thus held
in Betts that an alleged denial of due process was to be viewed in the context of an appraisal of the totality of the facts in a given case, and that
it was only "in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements" that a denial of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights was also
a denial of due process. Counsel need not be appointed to represent an
indigent defendant in a state court in other than a capital case unless
failure to appoint counsel would result in a trial "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right."28
In cases which followed the Betts decision the Supreme Court indi23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 457.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 461-62.
Id. at 473.
Ibid.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
cated that in applying the "special circumstances" test certain factors
would be considered, among them the following: the gravity of the
crime,29 the age and education of the defendant,"0 the conduct of the
court and prosecuting officials 1 and the complicated nature of the offense charged and possible defenses thereto. 2 It thus appears that Betts
v. Brady merely restated the long accepted rule that although the right to
be represented by retained counsel is fundamental to a fair hearing, the
right to appointed counsel in a state criminal proceeding is not so fundamental as to require appointment in all cases. Powell v. Alabama constituted an exception to this general rule, serving as authority for the
proposition that due process requires that a defendant accused of a capital crime in a state court must be represented by counsel in all cases.' s
Under the standard set forth in Betts, the sixth amendment was not incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and
the state courts were left to their own discretion in appointing counsel as
long as they did not violate the "special circumstances" test as set forth
in Betts and subsequent decisions.
A question which remained unanswered after the Betts case was
29. See, e.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
30. See, e.g., De Meerler v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 664-65 (1947).
31. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739-41 (1948).
32. See, e.g., Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789-91 (1945). In this case the defendant had entered a plea of guilty to burglary, in a Nebraska court, without being offered
counsel or being advised of his right to counsel. The alleged crime had been committed
on an Indian reservation which gave rise to a complex jurisdictional question. Although
the problem was not directly involved in this case, even after it had become clear that it
was the duty of all trial courts to appoint counsel in certain instances and under given
circumstances, many courts were of the view that there was no right to counsel and,
therefore, no duty to appoint counsel for a defendant who entered a plea of guilty. See,
e.g., Adkins v. Sanford, 120 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Commonwealth v. Ashe, 144 Pa.
Super. 209, 17 A.2d 749 (1941). This view arose from the fact that the words of the
sixth amendment and the constitutions of several states require only that an accused
have counsel "for his defense." BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 81. It was argued
that the right to counsel was established for the purpose of defending an accused at a
trial on the merits. A plea of guilty is the eqivalent of a conviction and the accused
waives all defenses. There can be no trial and no defense can be interposed in the accused's behalf; therefore, there is no right to counsel if one chooses to plead guilty.
Adkins v. Sanford, 120 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1941). Such a position can only be based
upon the unreasonable assumption that an accused knows his rights before entering a
plea even though he has not been advised 'by counsel. This view has lost its supporters,
however, and subsequently the Supreme Court has clearly stated that in regard to both
the sixth and fourteenth amendments, the right to counsel is not confined to representation during the trial on the merits. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) ; Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945). It has been
extended to several specific pre-trial stages, including arraignments at which a plea
must be entered. House v. Mayo, supra. However, it is usually stated that whether
lack of counsel constitutes a denial of due process must necessarily depend upon the
circumstances of the case. Crooker v. California, supra at 439.
33. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640, 674 (1948) (dictum).
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whether the judge or magistrate is under an affirmatve duty to inform
the accused of his right to counsel before accepting a plea. Whether by
constitution, statute, court rule or by case law, the majority of the state
courts, and the federal courts under Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, have decided that at least in a felony case such a
duty does exist.3" A few states, however, continue to require no advice
at all or only require that it be given in a capital case, and, in the absence
of strict statutory or constitutional provision, have refused to hold it
error for a court to fail to advise a defendant of his right to counsel in
any case.3" In jurisdictions which do require advice to be given to an
accused, failure to comply is error;" but some state reviewing tribunals
will go to great lengths in order to avoid declaring error in the trial court
proceedings."
In McNeal v. Culver3" the Supreme Court was faced squarely with
the issue of whether the failure of a state trial judge to advise an accused
of his right to appointed counsel might be a violation of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. 9 In an opinion by Mr. Justice Whittaker it was held that in cases where the circumstances require that the
defendant be given the aid of counsel in order to meet the minimum requirements of due process, the right to appointed counsel does not depend upon a request. It is thus apparent that there is no defense for a
state policy which allows a trial court judge to fail to advise an accused
of his right to counsel. Any state court judge or magistrate who does
34. See, e.g., People v. Whitsitt, 329 Mich. 656, 103 N.W.2d 424 (1960) ; People
v. Mullhern, 22 Misc. 2d 689, 199 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1960); State v. Burke, 7 Wis.
2d 673, 97 NAV.2d 703 (1959). Several states have enacted statutes requiring the
presiding judge or magistrate to inform the accused of his right to counsel before accepting a plea, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.26(2) (1958). Other states have accomplished the same result by court rule, e.g., N.J. Rules 1:12-9 (1958). A few states have
interpreted the right to counsel as granted in the state constitution to require that advice
be given to an accused, e.g., Indiana. See State v. Allen Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 571, 153
N.E.2d 914 (1958).
35. McNeal v. Culver, 113 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1959); Hoffman v. Alexander, 197
Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87 (1952).
36. E.g., State v. Griffith, 14 N.J. Super. 77, 81 A.2d 382 (1951).
37. E.g., a conviction has been presumed regular despite the silence of the record
as to whether the accused was informed of his rights, and such a presumption was held
not overcome -by the defendant's affidavit to the contrary. People v. Bean, 195 Misc.
1025, 91 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1949). In another case a statement in the record that the defendant "waives" counsel was held to imply that he was fully advised of his right.
People v. McGuinness, 121 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1953).
38. 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
39. The defendant was an indigent and mentally incompetent negro who had been
convicted on a charge of assault to murder in the second degree and sentenced to twenty
years imprisonment. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that
the trial court record was silent as to whether there had been a request for counsel, but
held that no absolute duty rested upon the trial court judge, under any circumstances, to
inquire as to the wish of the defendant to have counsel. 113 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1959).
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not offer counsel to a defendant appearing before him, at least when he
is charged with a serious offense, is courting reversal by the Supreme
Court under due process, and the failure of a reviewing court to recognize and correct such error serves only to propagate further difficulties
in the future. As an essential element of a fair hearing, state appellate
courts must strictly enforce a policy requiring trial court judges to inquire into the background and experience of an accused and inform him
of his right to counsel before accepting a plea.
As has been demonstrated, the right to counsel has been expanded
greatly in the past three decades; yet, the proposition that in most circumstances a defendant may waive his right to counsel has never been
seriously questioned.4" As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, to deprive
an accused of his right to waive counsel would be the equivalent of saying that "a layman is to be precluded from defending himself because the
Constitution is said to make him helpless without a lawyer's assistance
in questions of law."41
Under the "special circumstances" standard, whether a competent
waiver has been made when the situation is such as to require the appointment of counsel is said to be a question to be determined by the
court in the light of the circumstances of each case including the experience, background and conduct of the accused; but it has been repeatedly
held that in order to be valid such a waiver must be intelligently and
understandingly made. 2 The standards applicable in both federal and
state courts"2 for determining whether a waiver is competent are clearly
set out in Von Moltke v. Gillies:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension
of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included
within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.,"
Once a competent and intelligent waiver has been made it appears that the
courts will not permit an accused to later object.45
The official record of the trial court is of great importance to the
Supreme Court in determining whether or not a competent waiver has
40.
41.
42.
43.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).

44. 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1947).
45. United States v.Redfield, 197 F. Supp. 599 (D. Nev. 1961).
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been made. In most cases, if there is no affirmative recital of waiver of
counsel in the transcript of the trial court proceedings, it is assumed that
the defendant was not informed of his rights and that he did not waive
his right to counsel.4" The act of a state supreme court in presuming
waiver from a silent record will not be tolerated." In some cases it has
been held by the Court that a defendant must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that no actual waiver was made,4" but the Supreme Court
has recently held that this viewpoint is limited to cases in which the
record, or hearing if one is required, reveals that the accused af firmatively acquiesced in the waiver.49
THE "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST AND THE PLEA OF GUILTY-

BETTS v. BRADY EXAMINED
In the twenty years that passed after the Supreme Court ruled in

Betts v. Brady, the "special circumstances" rule came under constant criticism. Some of the most adamant of these attacks came from a strong
minority of the Court itself, led by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas." These views eventually gained ascendancy in Gideon v. Wainwright." The pronouncement of the "special circumstances" test yielded
a flood of petitions to the Supreme Court in forma pauperis which has
46. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962). At one time, in both federal
and state courts, it was held that a waiver of counsel could be implied from a plea of
guilty. See, e.g., Sedorko v. Hudspeth, 109 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Wilson v. Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 214, 199 P.2d 776 (1948). If the defendant entered a plea of guilty, and
the trial court record was silent as to whether he was advised of his right to counsel or
affirmatively waived his right to counsel, it was held that the burden was upon the
accused on appeal to prove that he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel. See,
e.g., State v. Young, 361 Mo. 529, 235 S.W2d 369 (1950). However, such decisions are
clearly erroneous in view of certain decisions by the Supreme Court, e.g., Rice v. Olson,
324 U.S. 786 (1945). In this case the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that it was not
necessary that there be a formal waiver of counsel even where the circumstances of the
case would ordinarily require the appointment of counsel, and that waiver will ordinarily be implied where an accused appears without counsel and fails to request counsel
be assigned if he pleads guilty. Id. at 787-88. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, stating that even where there had been a guilty plea, if such an implication is
treated as a conclusive presumption it is inconsistent with the constitutional right to
counsel. Id. at 788. However, the Court pointed out that the entry of a plea of guilty
in the absence of an express waiver of counsel in the record, might raise an issue of fact
requiring a hearing to determine whether the accused intelligently and understandingly
waived his right to counsel. Ibid. See also the discussion of this case in Carnley v.
Cochran, supra, at 515-16. The Supreme Court recently held that the trial court record
must show, or it must be alleged and proved, that an accused was offered counsel but
rejected such offer knowingly and understandingly and by an affirmative act other than
the mere entry of a plea of guilty. Carnley v. Cochran, supra, at 515.
47. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
48. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 162 (1957).
49. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1962).
50. See, e.g., the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Black in Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 and 518 (1962).
51. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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not appreciably diminished throughout the succeeding years. 2 Nevertheless, there is still a very large number of indigent defendants throughout
the United States who, although charged with serious crimes, are forced
to go without the aid of counsel. 3 This is but one indication of the unsatisfactory character of the rule. In its practical application the Betts
standard often hindered rather than served the ends of justice. The
"special circumstances" rule attempted to incorporate into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment the substance, but not the form of
the sixth amendment, i.e., in non-capital cases in a state court, counsel
need be appointed only when the circumstances of the case indicated that
the absence of counsel would result in an unfair trial. The result was
entirely unsatisfactory as two decades of practical experience in applying
the standard demonstrated.
It would appear that the right to counsel is of such a fundamental
nature and so essential to the concept of a fair hearing that a trial in
which the accused is not accorded the aid of counsel can almost never
meet the requirements of due process. Therefore, the form and substance of the sixth amendment are nearly coextensive-the substance is
embodied in the form and can rarely be satisfied unless the formal requirements are met. The presence of counsel is so necessary to the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing that its absence should be tolerated,
if ever, only when the defendant is charged, as in the case of most misdemeanors, with a relatively simple offense carrying a light penalty.
Under the Betts "special circumstances" standard it would appear
that the conviction of an accused of a serious crime would be more likely
to be sustained on review if the plea were guilty than if it were not
guilty.54 If the judge or magistrate were to carefully question the ac52. For a list of state court decisions that have been overturned by the Supreme
Court under the authority of Betts v. Brady, see Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 636

(1959).
53. With the ever increasing complexity of our society there has been, in the last
half century, an enormous increase in the number of people charged with serious crimes
and a corresponding rise in the need for appointed counsel. It has been estimated that
more than 2,000,000 people will be arrested and charged with serious crimes in the
United States this year. Of these, more than 1,000,000 will require free legal representation, but only about 100,000 will receive the services of voluntary and public defenders.
Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 MINN. L. REv. 737, 738-39 (1961). See also,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEmS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 39

(1959).
54. If the defendant enters a plea of guilt a trial is necessitated and the prejudicial
position in which the defendant is placed without counsel would very likely be demonstrated in the courtroom. In such a setting the accused would be called upon to defend
himself and to engage, in the person of the prosecutor, an adversary who would in most
cases be relatively well versed in knowledge of the law and in courtroom practice and
procedure. The accused, even under the guiding hand of the judge is bound to make
mistakes which will reveal themselves in retrospect, and which might very well be

NOTES
cused in order to ascertain his capabilities and to inform him of his right
to counsel before accepting a plea of guilty, and then pass sentence which
conforms to the statutory requirements, that counsel was necessary in
order to insure a fair trial does not readily reveal itself. However, it is
precisely in this situation that the inequities and impracticalities which
were inherent in the "special circumstances" rule are most evident, perhaps even more plainly than if pushed into the background by a trial replete with glaring errors resulting from the accused's attempts to defend
himself. These faults in the "special circumstances" standard can best
be illuminated by examining such a situation from the point of view of
the parties directly involved-the prosecutor, the judge and the accused.
On the face of the matter the position of the prosecutor would appear to be very favorable. If the record shows clearly that the accused
was offered counsel by the judge before being required to enter his plea
but affirmatively rejected such offer," the chances of reversal would
seem to be minimal. In such a situation, it has been held that the petitioner must show by a preponderance of evidence that his acquiescence
was not sufficiently understanding and intelligent to amount to an effective waiver." However, it does not appear in practice, even under the
Betts rule, that it was very difficult for an accused to sustain this burden.
In 1948, in the case of Uveges v. Pennsylvania the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a seventeen year old youth who had pleaded
guilty to four burglaries. The Court elaborated upon the Betts standard,
stating that:
Where the gravity of the crime and other factors-such as the
age and education of the defendant, the conduct of the court
and the prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature of the
offense charged and the possible defenses thereto-render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice as
to be fundamentally unfair . . . the accused must have legal
assistance . . . whether he pleads guilty or elects to stand

trial . ...

8

Under these circumstances a waiver could not be made understandingly
and intelligently.
deemed sufficient evidence by a reviewing tribunal that th presence of counsel was

necessary in order to insure a fair trial.
55. Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible and the Supreme Court
will indulge in every presumption against waiver of a fundamental right. Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1962).

56. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1962).
57. 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
58. Id. at 441.
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After the Uveges case the Supreme Court constantly broadened its
interpretation of the right of an indigent in a state court in a non-capital
case to appointed counsel, until the validity of almost any sentence passed
by a state court on an uncounseled defendant was ipso facto shrouded by
doubt. The case of Hudson v. North Carolind9 serves as an excellent illustration of this point. In that case the Supreme Court reversed the conviction for larceny of a defendant who, although only eighteen years old,
was found to be intelligent, well-informed and, because of past convictions, familiar and experienced in court procedure and criminal trials.
Without mentioning Betts v. Brady the Court held the conviction could
not stand because circumstances which arose during the trial raised problems "requiring professional knowledge and experience beyond a layman's ken."" After this decision there could be no doubt that the validity of any conviction by a state court of an uncounseled indigent defendant in a serious crime, if it came before the Supreme Court of the
United States, would stand little chance of being upheld. Shortly after
the Hudson case, Mr. Justice Douglas stated in another opinion that it
would be doubtful that the Court would agree to Betts v. Brady if it were
before the Court de novo.6' It was therefore clear that the "special circumstances" rule had evolved to the point where, even if the accused had
entered a plea of guilty and affirmatively waived counsel, it would have
been unwise for any prosecutor who desired his convictions to stand, to
rely upon Betts v. Brady on appeal. On the contrary, it would appear to
be in his interest to see that an accused received effective assistance of
counsel before being called upon to enter a plea.
The trial judge had additional reasons than those stated above for not
viewing the Betts rule with favor. The "special circumstances" standard
was so vague that it could not in any real sense have been said to be a
standard at all. Such a nebulous "standard" does little to aid the court
in determining whether the refusal to appoint counsel in a given case is
within the boundaries of the fourteenth amendment, and was said not to
59. 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
60. Id. at 703.
61. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (concurring opinion). In the course
of this opinion he continued, stating that:
Betts v. Brady requires the indigent, when convicted in a trial where he has no
counsel, to show that there was fundamental unfairness. We have set aside a
number of convictions . . . yet this is a heavy burden to carry, especially for
an accused who has no lawyer and who cannot afford to hire one. It is a burden placed on an accused solely by reason of his poverty. Its only sanction is
Betts v. Brady which is so at war with our concept of equal justice under law

that it should be overruled. Are we to wait to overrule it until a case arises
where the indigent is unable to make a convincing demonstration that the absence of counsel prejudiced him?

Id. at 119.
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serve as a guide but rather only to confuse the courts.6 2 The trial court
judge was forced to apply the Betts rule prospectively with the danger
that his judgment to allow a defendant to proceed without counsel would
not measure up to the minimum constitutional standards. The necessarily prospective-retrospective process involved in applying a rule of law
at the trial and appellate levels, combined with the inherent vagueness of
the "special circumstances" test, made it almost impossible for a trial
court judge to apply it with any certainty.
Consider, for example, the case of Moore v. Michigan.63 The Supreme Court reversed a conviction entered on a plea of guilty by a seventeen year old youth charged with the murder of an elderly lady.64 The
judge had conferred privately with the defendant for some five to ten
minutes before accepting his plea of guilty, and had offered to appoint
counsel, which offer was affirmatively rejected by the petitioner because "he wanted to get it over with."6
In a subsequent hearing facts
were revealed which indicated that the defendant's plea was entered under threats of mob violence by the sheriff. Apparently these facts were
unknown to the judge. The record of the hearing also showed possible
defenses, including insanity and mistaken identity, which might reasonably have been asserted at the trial, but the extent of their availability
raised questions of considerable technical difficulty beyond the defendant's capacity to comprehend. It was held by the Supreme Court that
the petitioner had sustained his ultimate burden of proving that his plea
of guilty was erroneously accepted and that he did not waive his right
to counsel.
Although it has been held that the constitutional right to appointed
counsel does not justify forcing counsel upon an accused, it has also been
pointed out that the right is not so absolute that it must be recognized
when to do so would disrupt the court's business,66 and in most courts
the judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty without the advice of
counsel." 7 It would appear that the only way by which a judge could
have escaped the vagueness of the Betts standard would have been to
62. See comments of Mr. Justice Black in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 518
(1962) (concurring opinion).

63.
64.
counsel
65.

355 U.S. 152 (1957).
Murder is not a capital offense in Michigan, and therefore appointment of
was not mandatory under the "special circumstances" rule.
355 U.S. 155, 162 (1957).

66. United States v. Private Brands, Inc. 250 F.2d 554 (C.A.N.Y. 1958), cert. deWLied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958).
67. E.g., in Sheeler v. Burke, 367 Pa. 152, 79 A.2d 654 (1951), it was held that
when a defendant is charged with an extremely serious crime a plea of guilty should
not be accepted by the court until the accused has conferred with counsel. This is a
laudatory position.
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avoid the necessity of having it applied later by refusing to accept a plea
of guilty without counsel.
It is the accused, however, who suffers most from want of counsel.
An accused who pleads guilty to a serious crime has no less need for
counsel than if he were to elect to go to trial. The crucial decision of
whether to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty often cannot be made intelligently by an uncounseled defendant. Such a defendant is not fully
protected even if the judge explains the nature of the charge, the possible
defenses thereto and the consequences of a plea of guilty. Defense counsel, if appointed promptly, can interview the defendant, investigate the
facts and research the law in order to determine the meaning and scope
of the indictment and its validity. An accused who has had no training
or experience in law is not competent to decide on reasonable legal
grounds how to plead in a complex case involving several possible defenses, different degrees of the crime charged and a multitude of complicated issues. His decision is likely to be influenced by factors such as
remorse or grief. For example, knowing that he committed the act of
killing another person, the accused might plead guilty to murder in the
first degree without considering the possibility that the requisite intent
was lacking, or that there were other facts present which could reduce
the charge to second degree murder or manslaughter.
The need for a lawyer at the sentencing of a defendant who pleads
guilty may be even greater than his need at arraignment or trial. In
many states the sentencing structure is extremely complicated and not
easily understood even by experienced practitioners. Whether a defendant is committed to one penal institution or another may result in a
greater or lesser punishment.6" Problems also arise as to whether a specific sentence imposed upon a defendant will concur with a prior sentence
or begin to run only at the expiration of the prior sentence. Questions
arise as to whether a conviction on two related counts may result in only
a single sentence or whether one bill of indictment or count merges with
another. 9 Nowhere is the need of an indigent defendant for appointed
counsel more eloquently stated than by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell
v. Alabama:

The right to be heard would be, in many cases of little avail if
it did-not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incap68. See Pollock, supra note 53, at 742-43.
69. Ibid.
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able, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issues or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
70
establish his innocence.
From the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that the "special
circumstances" rule was impractical, inequitable and generally, unsatisfactory to meet the needs of all the parties concerned.7 By an evolutionary process the rule set down in Betts v. Brady became a "dead letter"
which could not be relied upon by a prosecutor to sustain convictions and
which was impossible for a trial court judge to apply with any certainty.
A belief that an unassisted defendant could guide himself through the
myriad of pitfalls which exist in the complexities of our criminal laws
and procedure, simply because he is not charged with a capital offense,
2 was handed down
is clearly unreasonable. When Gideon v. Wainwright"
by the Supreme Court overruling Betts v. Brady its main weakness lay in
the fact that it had been so long in coming.
TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE INDIGENT ACCUSED: GIDEON V.
WAINWRIGHT AND DOUGLAS V. CALIFORNIA

In two decisions handed down on the same day, the Supreme Court
70. 287 U.S. 45, 64 (1932).
71.

As recently stated by justice Black in his concurring opinion in Carnley v.

Cochran:
Twenty years' experience in the state and federal courts with the Betts it. Brady
rule has demonstrated its basic failure as a constitutional guide. Indeed, it has
served not to guide but to confuse the courts as to when a person prosecuted by

a state for crime is entitled to a lawyer. Little more could be expected, however, of a standard which imposes upon the courts nothing more than the perplexing responsibility of appointing lawyers for an accused when a trial judge
believes that failure to do so would be "shocking to the universal sense of
justice." To be sure, in recent years this Court has been fairly consistent in
assuring indigent defendants the right to counsel. As the years have gone on
we have been compelled even under the Betts rule to reverse more and more
state convictions either for new trial or for hearing to determine whether counsel has been erroneously denied-a result that in my judgment is due to a
growing recognition of the fact that our Bill of Rights is correct in assuming
that no layman should be compelled to defend himself in a criminal prosecution.
369 U.S. 506, 518 (1962).

72. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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made great strides toward the ultimate goal of achieving equal justice in
state criminal proceedings for the rich and poor alike. In the first of
these decisions, Gideon v. Wainwright," the Court overruled the "special
circumstances" test of Betts v. Brady. The petitioner was charged in a
Florida state court with breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to
commit a misdemeanor, a felony charge under Florida law. When he
was brought before the court, the accused, an indigent, requested that
counsel be appointed to aid in his defense. The judge replied that under
Florida law counsel could be appointed only in capital cases.74 The case
was tried before a jury. Gideon made an opening statement, crossexamined the state's witnesses, produced witnesses in his defense and
made a short closing argument. In general, "he conducted his defense
about as well as could be expected from a layman." 7 The petitioner was
sentenced to five years in the state prison upon a verdict of guilty. The
Florida Supreme Court denied his petition for habeas corpus without
opinion. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
overruling Betts v. Brady by a unanimous vote.
Mr. Justice Black, a dissenter in the Betts case and one of the most
ardent opponents of the "special circumstances" rule,"0 delivered the
opinion of the Court. He pointed out the striking similarity in the fact
situations of the Betts and the Gideon cases-both defendants had been
charged with non-capital felony offenses, had been denied appointment of
counsel upon request, had pleaded not guilty and had conducted their own
defenses. It was Justice Black's conclusion that the fact situations in the
two cases were so similar that to leave Betts standing would require a rejection of Gideon's claim, and that, therefore, Betts v. Brady should be
overruled." He took the position that the Court in overruling Betts v.
Brady was not treading upon new ground, but that Betts had made an abrupt break with well-considered precedents, especially Powell v. Alabanw,
in deciding that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right
essential to a fair trial."78 He stated:
In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than
the new, we but restore constitutional principles established to
achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these precedents but
also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
73.
74.
75.
76.

Ibid.
Id. at 337.
Ibid.
See, e.g., Justice Black's concurring opinion in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.

506, 518 (1962).
77. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
78. Id. at 344.

NOTES
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him."8
If the character of the "special circumstances" rule was so entirely
unsatisfactory, it might reasonably be asked why it was set forth in the
first place, why the Court appeared so reluctant to overrule it over an
extended period of time and why in Gideon v. Wainwright the Court
overcame this reluctance and overturned Betts v. Brady. The answer to
these questions, it would appear, involves the examination of at least
three basic considerations which leads in turn to discussion of certain
problems to be encountered under the Gideon decision.
First, it is evident that the obligations of federalism have weighed
heavily upon the Supreme Court in the area of right to counsel in state
criminal proceedings. It should be recalled that Mr. Justice Roberts in
his opinion in Betts announced the "special circumstances" rule only after
a careful examination of historical materials and state constitutional and
statutory provisions, from which he concluded that it was the judgment
of the states that the right to counsel is not a fundamental right essential
to a fair trial."0 Mr. Justice Black expressed his disagreement wih his
conclusion in his dissenting opinion in Betts v. Brady."' In Gideon v.
Wainwright he reiterated his disagreement with the conclusions reached
by Mr. Justice Roberts, and took the position that in no way is the
Gideon decision inconsistent with the concept of federalism. 2 In concluding his opinion, Justice Black stated:
Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the
Court's holding in Powell v. Alaba-ma rested. Florida, supported by two other states, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left
intact. Twenty-two states, as friends of the court, argue that
Betts was "an anachronism when handed down, and that it
should now be overruled." We agree.8 3
The influence of federalism on decisions by the Court in the area of
right to counsel in state criminal proceedings is evident in several other
79. Ibid.
80. See quote accompanying footnote 25, supra.
81. 316 U.S. 455, 476 (1942).
82. "From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to insure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law...
" 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
83. Id. at 345.
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opinions.84 There can be little doubt that in the period between the decision in Betts v. Brady and Gideon v. Wainwright the scope of due process was expanded by constant evolutionary process and state authority
was limited correspondingly. However, as is demonstrated by the Supreme Court opinions in Betts, Gideon and other cases, such evolution
did not take place without homage being paid to the concept of federalism. Perhaps too often that which represents a manifestation of increased activity on the part of both state and national governments in a
given area is taken as evidence of usurpation of power by the federal
government alone.8" Federalism was an important element in the formulation and perpetuation of the "special circumstances" rule. Betts, it
would seem, was overruled only when a majority of the Court was of the
opinion that in the overwhelming number of states the right to counsel is
now considered fundamental and essential to a fair trial.
A second consideration which has guided the Court in its failure to
overrule Betts v. Brady lies in its reluctance to set down an all-encompassing requirement of appointed counsel for indigents in state criminal
proceedings.86 Even after Gideon the question still remains where, if at
all, the line should be drawn between situations where counsel must be
appointed for the indigent defendant and where appointment is not considered necessary. A satisfactory indication of what the Court will do
in the future in regard to this issue cannot be found in the Gideon decision. Although Justice Black's opinion might perhaps give color to an
assertion that under the Gideon decision the states must now appoint
counsel for indigent defendants in all criminal cases whatever the circumstances, 7 the opinion of the Court must be viewed in light of the fact
that a felony charge was involved. Some insight might be gathered from
the opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Clark. Justice Harlan makes it very clear that it is his view that the Court is not, by the
Gideon decision, removing all barriers and requiring appointment of
counsel for indigents in all cases. He states that the time has come when
the "special circumstances" rule should be abandoned in non-capital as
well as capital cases "at least as to offenses which, as the one involved
84. See, e.g., the opinions of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S.
134, 139 (1947) and Mr. Justice Burton in Bute v. Illinois, 33 U.S. 640, 668 (1948).
85. For an excellent discussion of the role of federalism in the decisions of the
Supreme Court see Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, azd State Systelns of Criminal .'stice, 8 DE PAUL L. Ray. 213 (1959).
86. The fear of the practical consequences of such a requirement was expressed by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Foster v. Illinois: "Such an abrupt innovation . . . would
furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide the prison doors of the
land." Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947).
87. "[A]ny person haled into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence. (Whether the
rule should be extended to all criminal cases need not now be decided.)""8
Justice Clark, on the other hand, would seem to prefer placing more emphasis on the substance of the charge rather than the severity of the
sanction involved."9
Although it cannot be pinpointed in Gideon v. Wainwright, it appears evident that the Court will not impose a strict requirement upon the
states for appointment of counsel in all criminal cases. The administration of state and municipal criminal courts would come to a standstill if
they were required to hear argument by appointed counsel on behalf of
every indigent who is arrested for a simple crime such as, for example,
jaywalking. It would seem that to draw a strict and inflexible line at any
point based solely upon the sanction involved would be utterly unworkable. A felony-misdemeanor line under Gideon would appear equally as
illogical as the capital-non-capital distinction drawn under the "special
circumstances" rule.9" However, this is not to say that counsel should
not be appointed in cases where the defendant is charged with a minor
offense; often even misdemeanors entail serious punishment and involve
complex issues.9 An unyielding rule at the federal level could not take
into consideration the totality of the various factors involved and would
stifle experimentation and variation at the state level, which at times has
yielded valuable contributions to the attainment of justice. The need of
the defendant should be the determining factor in appointment of counsel.
As was stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Bute v.
Illinois:
[I]t is the need for counsel that establishes the real standard for
determining whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial unfair. And the need for counsel, even by Betts v. Brady standards, is not determined by the complexities of the individual
case or the ability of the particular person who stands as an
accused before the court. That need is measured by the nature
of the charge and the ability of the average man to face it alone,
unaided by an expert in the law.9"
88. Id. at 351.
89. "The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the deprival of
'liberty' just as for deprival of 'life,' and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in
the quality of the process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved." 335 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (concurring opinion).
90. For a criticism of the capital-non-capital distinction, see Mr. Justice Clark's
opinion, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) (concurring opinion).
91. E.g, in New York misdemeanors may be punishable by an indeterminate prison
sentence of not more than three years. N.Y. ConREcTiox LAw, § 203.
92. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 682 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
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It might be argued that unless a strict line is drawn by the Court,
the vagueness inherent in the "special circumstances" rule will continue
in Gideon and that Gideon merely served to reduce the minimum requirement for appointed counsel for indigents from a capital offense to felony
offenses. It is submitted, however, that even if this is true it is not
necessarily undesirable and Gideon nevertheless represents a signiicant
advancement over Betts. Gideon does lower that point at which counsel
must be appointed and it discards the illogical capital-non-capital distinction. There can be little doubt that in the future the substance of the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright will be extended to cases involving crimes
of a less severe nature and only administrative convenience would seem
to stand in the way of requiring appointment of counsel in all cases.
Whereas under Betts the emphasis was placed upon the "special circumstances" requiring appointment of counsel (although in subsequent decisions these "special circumstances" covered nearly all situations) it'would
appear that Gideon, by its specific rejection of Betts, takes a more positive approach, requiring appointment of counsel except in special circumstances. Even if a strict line is not drawn delineating those situations in
which appointment of counsel is and is not necessary, Gideon nonetheless
serves to reduce that area wherein the requirement of appointed counsel
is questionable. Under this decision it appears that doubt would arise
only in cases where the sanction involved is relatively light, but because
of the nature of the offense the need for counsel is great. This is a
much narrower area than the vagueness of the "special circumstances"
rule, which encompassed the entire area of appointed counsel with the
exception of capital cases. A rule which avoids drawing fixed lines in
this area provides necessary flexibility, while a strict and unbending
dividing line would have no legally justifiable basis.
The third consideration which appears to underlie the decision of the
Supreme Court to overrule Betts v. Brady is the failure of the "special
circumstances" rule to serve as a discernible guide for state trial courts.
As stated previously, through an evolutionary process the Betts rule
reached the point where, for all practical purposes, appointment of counsel was required in all cases of a serious nature. 93 This fact is recognized
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wain4 In stating his reasons for supporting the overruling of Betts v.
wright."
Brady he continues:
93. See text accompanying notes 59-61, supra.
94. 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (concurring opinion).
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This evolution, however, appears not to have been fully recognized by the state courts, in this instance charged with the
front-line responsibility for the enforcement of constitutional
rights. To continue a rule which is honored by this court only
with lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run wil do
disservice to the federal system. 5
Therefore, the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright does not appear to represent in any sense an expanded concept of constitutional law. It is, on
the contrary, merely a clearer statement of what had come to be the "special circumstances" rule as it had developed over the period of its existence. The Gideon decision, therefore, finds its basis more in practical
considerations than in constitutional theory, and it was necessitated by
the refusal of some states to recognize its existence as the substance of
the expanded Betts rule.
The second decision leading toward equal justice for the indigent,
decided the same day as Gideon, was Douglas v. California." Here, the
Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether under any circumstances counsel must be appointed to assist indigents on appeal in
state criminal proceedings. The petitioners had been tried jointly in a
California court on an information charging them with thirteen felonies,
including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon and assault with intent
to kill. At the trial they were represented by a single public defender,
who entered motions for a continuance to allow adequate time to prepare
the defense and for separate counsel because he felt that there was a conflict of interest between the defendants. These motions were denied.
Thereupon the petitioners dismissed the defender and renewed the motions which were again denied. The jury returnd a verdict of guilty on
all charges.
On direct appeal from the conviction, the petitioners requested the
California District Court of Appeal to appoint counsel. The court declined appointment under a California rule of criminal procedure providing that upon request by an indigent for appointment of counsel on
appeal the court may make an independent investigation of the record
and should deny the appointment of counsel only if such appointment
would, in the opinion of the appellate court, be of no value to either the
defendant or the court. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed and re95. Ibid.
96. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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manded to the California District Court of Appeal, three justices dissenting.
The majority of the Court held that under certain circumstances a
denial of counsel on appeal might violate both the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. However, Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the Court, expressly limited the application of the holding to the first appeal as a matter of right following conviction." The emphasis in the majority opinion is directed toward equal
protection and the holding of the Court is placed within that broad area
staked out by the Court in Griffin v. Illinois and subsequent decisions
following that case." Justice Douglas pointed out that absolute equality
between defendants is not required, but when an indigent is denied counsel on his only appeal as a matter of right, he has been deprived of his
rights under the Constitution.9 9
It might appear that the decision in Douglas v. Californiais a logical
extension of the Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright and it would
have been more desirable therefore, to have set forth the holding in an
opinion emphasizing due process through the fair trial concept without
the necessity of relying upon equal protection. The basis for such a contention is revealed in Justice Douglas' opinion:
When an indigent is forced to run this gauntlet of a preliminary
showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair
procedure. In the federal courts, on the other hand, an indigent
must be afforded counsel on appeal whenever he challenges a
certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith.'
97. Id. at 356.
98. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Supreme Court held that an indigent man, convicted of armed robbery, was deprived of his constitutional rights under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment by a failure of

the state of Illinois to provide him with a transcript necessary for jurisdiction on direct

appeal. It was stated that a state with an appellate system which makes available tran-

scripts to those individuals who can afford them was required by the Constitution to
provide "means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent de-

fendants." Id. at 20. The substance of this case has been extended to several other related situations on appeal, e.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) where the public
defender was given discretion in taking appeal cases, but also had sole authority to grant
an indigent a free transcript which was necessary for appeal and could only be obtained

if the defender accepted the appeal.

See also, Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487

(1963) where it was held that the conclusion of a trial judge that an indigent's appeal is

frivolous was an inadequate substitute for full appellate review which was available to
non-indigents, where the effect of the trial judge's action prevented an appeal based on
a complete record of the trial proceedings available to non-indigent defendants. For
an excellent analysis of the Griffin case and its implications in state criminal proceedings, see Wilcox and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNEiL L.Q. 1 (1957).

99. 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
100. Ibid.
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However, in his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Harlan attempts to refute
the validity of deciding Douglas v. California under due process. He distinguishes the Gideon decision from the holding in Douglas v. California
on three grounds: first, the fourteenth amendment does not require appellate review in itself; second, the questions raised on appeal are circumscribed by the record of the proceedings leading to conviction and do not
involve the wide variety of strategic and tactical problems which must be
faced at trial; and third, as California applies its rule, the indigent is
guaranteed full consideration of his appeal and receives the benefit of
expert legal appraisal by a conscientious examination of the merits of the
case, based upon the trial record, by the appellate court itself.:10
Justice Harlan's first contention appears to have little merit.
Granted that the fourteenth amendment does not require appellate review
in itself and that arbitrary discrimination is the traditional standard for
measuring a violation of equal protection; however, once appellate review is granted as a matter of right it becomes a part of due process and
an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination deprives one of a fair trial
as readily as it would violate equal protection. A privilege, although one
not required by due process, once granted might give rise to a denial of
due process through the fair trial concept if it is arbitrarily applied to
10 2
some but not to others.

In regard to Justice Harlan's second point, it is perhaps true that the
issues on appeal are circumscribed by the record, and therefore, do not
involve the strategic and tactical problems faced at the trial; however,
this does not merit the conclusion that the need for counsel on appeal is
not great. As pointed out by Justice Douglas in his opinion, in a situation such as the one presented in Douglas v. Californiainvolving the first
appeal as a matter of right following conviction, if appointment of counsel is not required the indigent does not have the benefit of counsel's
research of the law, examination of the record and marshalling of argument on his behalf." 3 In essence, "[T]he indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual,
while the rich man has a meaningful appeal."'""
101. Id. at 363-67.
102. This is embodied in the substance of the statement by Mr. Justice Black in
Griffin v. Illinois that:
Our own constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection both call
for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discrimination ...
Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire
judicial system-all people charged with crime, must, so far as the law is concerned, "Stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court."

351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
103. 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
104. Ibid.
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As to Justice Harlan's third argument, it might be said that even
though an appellate court does the best job that can be expected of it, the
judges cannot in addition be prevailed upon to fill the roll of defense
counsel. In most cases it would appear that they would not be in a position to expend the necessary time and energy to prepare a case on appeal."0 5
In addition, Justice Harlan argues that as indigents the petitioners
were no doubt constantly faced with burdens imposed upon them by the
state that are more easily satisfied by the affluent, e.g., it is much easier
for the well-to-do to pay tuition at a state university. In fact the indigent may be altogether deprived of a higher education because he is
unable to pay such fees. Yet the constitutionality of such acts cannot be
challenged, nor can it be said that under the Constitution the state must
provide such services to indigents without charge."' A state welfare law
could not be successfully attacked because it does not provide the quality
of goods or services to the needy that may be purchased by others for
Although he does not address himself directly to this
themselves.'
argument, the answer is implicit in the position taken in the opinion of the
Court by Mr. Justice Douglas. Basic legal services such as counsel are
simply not of the same character as welfare laws or university tuition
fees. Embodied in the substance of our constitutional system is the concept of equal access to the processes of law. There would be no constitutional bar to a state's charging tuition to a state university, and there
is no contradiction in holding it a denial of due process or equal protection for a state to require an indigent to face his only appeal as a matter
of right without counsel.
Whether the right to counsel on appeal will or should be extended to
cases other than those involving the first appeal following conviction is
not considered by the Court in Douglas v. California. It would appear
that in a court system which has been careful in safeguarding an indigent's rights by affording effective assistance of counsel not only at the
trial court level, but also on direct appeal following conviction, that at
least a reasonable amount of discretion should be allowed the appellate
105. That the presiding judge cannot adequately be substituted for counsel at trial
or an appeal, although the statement refers specifically to counsel at the trial level, is
aptly expressed in Powell v. Alabama:
How can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively discharge

the obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it that in
the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly and
fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or par-

ticipate in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which
sometimes partake of the inviolable character of a confessional.
287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932).

106. 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963).
107. Ibid.

NOTES
court in deciding whether counsel ought to be appointed in other mandatory or discretionary appeals. This view appears to be in conformity
with the present practice in federal courts.' 8 After once being provided
counsel on appeal it would appear that it would be difficult, in most cases,
for a defendant to demonstrate that the effectiveness of appellate review
was denied or that in some other manner he suffered a substantial Igal
injury under either due process or equal protection, because the appellate
court was allowed to exercise a degree of discretion in deciding whether
counsel would be of benefit on appeal.
CONCLUSIONS

In Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas v. California the Supreme
Court has taken great strides toward making the constitutional ideal of
equal justice before the law a living reality in American society. Betts v.
Brady demonstrated its inadequacy to serve as a foundation upon which
progress could be made. However, Gideon and Douglas constitute only
a starting point; they provide that foundational material which Betts
lacked. Ultimately, the responsibility for providing counsel for all indigents charged with crimes in state courts must be borne by the states
and local communities themselves, in conjunction with their bar associations."' In fulfilling the charge of Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas
v. California to provide counsel for those unable to provide for themselves, the economic burden upon the community will be increased."'
Nonetheless, it would appear that the truly distressing thing is that counsel is not being provided under procedures existing in some states for
those whose needs are immediate and urgent. That the right of an indigent to counsel is basic to the constitutional concept of a fair hearing,
and that the burden of providing such services must be shouldered by the
108. For an informative comment on appellate proceedings in federal courts see,
Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1961).
109. In 1959 the Association of the Bar of the city of New York and the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, joint sponsors of a Special Committee to Study
Defender Systems, published an informative study based on a review of the actual
operations of a number of representative defender organizations and its own collective
experience, entitled EQuA JUSTICE FOR THE AccuSED (1959). It concluded that each
individual community should select the type of defender system best suited to its needs,
based on the type and size of the community, the number of indigents accused, the probable cost to the community and the conditions within the local bar. Id. at 79. The report is extremely optimistic concerning the ability of each community to meet the demands for appointed counsel through cooperation of the members of the bar in a system
which enlists community participation and responsibility. Id. at 61.
110. However, relatively speaking it appears that the cost of a well-planned defender system need not be at all prohibitive. It has been estimated that in order to provide adequate coverage the budget of a voluntary or public defender system should range
from fifteen to twenty-five per cent of that of the public prosecutor and could be raised
from either public or private sources. Id. at 81.
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community at large, is embodied in the statement by former Attorney
General Brownell that:
So long as there is to be a government of and by law, we hold
no doubt that the burden of prosecution is a community responsibility.

.

..

Equally, the burden of providing a fair trial

is upon the community. The right to representation is a concomitant of fair trial, and though it is personal to the defendant
and may vary with his choice and means, it cannot be permitted
to fail just because the accused is a poor person. At that point
the community must supply the deficiency.111
Betts v. Brady is interred, the way has been cleared, and a framework
provided-the community must now respond to the challenge to meet its
responsibilities.

IMPLIED AND EXPRESS WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
It has been noted that one-third of all sales litigation involves warranty obligations in sales contracts.' It is expected, moreover, that the
warranty provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code and the changes
in existing warranty law which it effectuates will continue to provide a
major source of litigation. Even with the changes, simplifications and
clarifications which it has introduced into warranty law, the Code is in no
way a utopian problem-solving piece of legislation for the commercial
community. As evidenced by the extensive literature on the subject3
warranty law under the Uniform Commercial Code continues to be a
111. Representation of Indigent Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases (Hearing
Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repr., Feb. 17,
1954), p. 21.
1.

HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE),

36 (1955).
2.

Unless otherwise indicated, the citations are to the 1958 Official Draft which is

effective in Indiana on July 1, 1964.
3. See, e.g., 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

§§ 2-313 to -316 (1961);
Ezer, The Impact of Tle Uniform, Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 281 (1961); Mason, Article 2: Sales, 21 MONT. L. REV.
4 (1959) ; 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1960) ; 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 331 (1954). The Uniform Commercial Code has not met with universal approval. Compare Williston, The Law of
Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAIv. L. REv. 561 (1950) with
Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Shoidd it be Enacted? 59 YALE L.J.
821 (1950).
(1953).

See also, Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code, 22
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